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This article deals with the nature of the objective-subjective dichotomy, first from a general historical point of view, and then with regard to the use of these terms over time to describe theories of probability.  The different (metaphysical and epistemological) meanings of “objective” and “subjective” are analyzed, and then used to show that all probability theories can be divided into three broad classes.


The words “objective” and “subjective” have a long history and a number of different meanings, as shown by their lengthy entries in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED).  This article summarizes their use as contrasting concepts, first from a general historical viewpoint (Section 1), and then as applied to theories of probability from about 1700 to the present day (Section 2).  In addition, by using the metaphysical and epistemological meanings of the objective-subjective terms, any interpretation of probability put forward over the years is shown to belong to one of three general classes (Sections 3 and 4).  

1. The Dichotomy Historically

Consider first the modern understanding of the dichotomy from a metaphysical point of view.  Metaphysics deals with the fundamental nature of what exists, and in this regard “objective” refers to something that has a real existence in the world independent of being thought of, whereas “subjective” refers to anything that depends for its existence on consciousness.  Thus an individual has objective attributes such as weight and height, whereas the person’s honesty and intelligence are subjective.  To regard these subjective qualities as attributes that can be measured is the fallacy of reification.
It is an interesting fact that scholars of the Middle Ages used “objective” and “subjective” with meanings that are the exact reverse of those that are used today.  The OED (2017) illustrates this with an untranslated quote in Latin (c. 1325) from the work of the nominalist William of Ockham.  A modern translation is as follows (Spade 1994, 218):

A universal is not anything real having subjective being [existence], either in the soul [mind] or outside the soul [mind].  Instead it only has objective being [existence] in the soul [mind].  It is a kind of fictum [mental picture] having being [existence] in objective being [existence] like what the external thing has in subjective being [existence].​[1]​

Over the succeeding centuries there was a gradual shift from the scholastic distinction to its modern form.  Lorraine Daston (1994) has described these changes as reflected in philosophical works and various dictionaries of the time, writing that “the meanings of the terms had, however, already branched and crisscrossed in the 17th century in both Latin and in various vernaculars, although ‘objective’ still generally modified thoughts rather than external objects” (333).  Mid-19th century German and French dictionaries traced the origin of the newer meanings to Immanuel Kant, although this has been questioned by Machiel Karskens (1992) in his detailed study of the use of the dichotomy in the 18th century.  He writes that the work of philosopher Adolph Hoffmann​[2]​ (Vernunftlehre, 1737) “strongly accentuates in subjective the internal, particular state of mind in (the consciousness of) the knowing person or subject,” and that Hoffmann used “object(ive) to refer to the status of the real existence of the thing or event in itself, apart from intentional acts of understanding” (247).  Karskens suggests these ideas influenced Kant and his followers, and led to the “final equation of subject with human beings and of object with extra-mental entities” (251).
The OED (2017) gives examples from the 17th century of both the scholastic and modern meanings of the words, but the scholastic use was gradually displaced.  The dictionary gives a good example of the modern sense from the late 18th century (Anonymous 1793, 498):  “Have the objects, which we consider as really existing, in fact, a real objective existence, independent of our mode of perceiving them?”  This usage became more common in English after 1800, owing perhaps to the work of poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who studied in Germany and was influenced by the ideas of Kant and his followers.  In his Biographia Literaria ([1817] 1967, 174) he writes:  

Now the sum of all that is merely OBJECTIVE we will henceforth call NATURE, confining the term to its passive and material sense, as comprising all the phenomena by which its existence is made known to us.  On the other hand the sum of all that is SUBJECTIVE, we may comprehend in the name of the SELF or INTELLIGENCE.  Both conceptions are in necessary antithesis.

In addition to this metaphysical view of the objective-subjective terms, there is also an epistemological dichotomy, which refers basically to whether one is impartial (or not) when making judgments.  The OED (2017) shows that this usage in English dates from the early 19th century.  These two dichotomies will be discussed further in Section 3.  

2. The Dichotomy and Probability

The systematic treatment of probability is usually regarded as beginning in the second half of the 17th century.  This period saw the famous correspondence between Pascal and Fermat in 1654, the publication of Christiaan Huygens’s book on games of chance (1657), and John Graunt’s analysis of the data in weekly bills of mortality (1662).  At the same time there emerged the idea of the dual nature of probability, as described by Hacking ([1975] 2006, 12):  “On the one side it is statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes.  On the other side it is epistemological, dedicated to assessing reasonable degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background.”  With hindsight one can identify this difference, but probability theorists up to the mid-19th century did not distinguish explicitly between the two approaches.
Various descriptions have been used for this duality, such as objective versus epistemic, or frequency-type versus belief-type; in this article it is referred to as the metaphysical objective- subjective dichotomy.  Thus if probability is regarded as an actual physical property of a system, existing independent of consciousness and estimated by repeatable measurements of some kind, then it is “objective,” otherwise it is “subjective,” that is, dependent on consciousness and having a value assigned to represent a state of knowledge.   
In the 1680s Jacob Bernoulli worked on his important book Ars Conjectandi, but it was published posthumously only in 1713.  In it he writes ([1713] 2006, 315, emphasis in original):

The certainty of anything is considered either objectively and in itself or subjectively and in relation to us.  Objectively, certainty means nothing else than the truth of the present or future existence of the thing.  Subjectively, certainty is the measure of our knowledge concerning this truth.  In themselves and objectively, all things under the sun, which are, were, or will be, always have the highest certainty.

Bernoulli was a determinist; he believed that what happens in the future “will occur with certainty” as a result of “the highest Creator’s omniscience and omnipotence” (315).  This is what Bernoulli called objective certainty, whereas the certainty of we mortals is subjective, limited by our incomplete knowledge of the future.  This leads to the concept of probability (315, emphasis in original):  “Probability, indeed, is degree of certainty, and differs from the latter as a part differs from the whole.”  Although he did not use “objective” or “subjective” to describe probability as such, his approach is generally in accord with the metaphysical distinction introduced above:  that “objective” means independent of human cognition, whereas “subjective” refers to one’s state of knowledge.  Regarding Bernoulli’s analysis, Hacking ([1975] 2006, 145) writes that “for the first time a ‘subjective’ conception of probability is explicitly avowed.” 
One hundred years later one finds Laplace ([1814] 1995, 2) expressing a similar determinism:

All events, even those that on account of their rarity seem not to obey the great laws of nature, are as necessary a consequence of these laws as the revolutions of the sun. … We ought then to consider the present state of the universe as the effect of its previous state and as the cause of that which is to follow.

Thus Laplace believed that the laws of physics determine the future of the physical world.  It is only because of our lack of all the knowledge required to apply these laws that the future cannot be predicted, hence the need for probability, a measure of uncertainty: “Probability is relative in part to this ignorance and in part to our knowledge” (3).  Laplace did not use the words “objective” or “subjective” in his writings, but he and Bernoulli shared a similar subjective view. 
By the early 1800s the modern version of the dichotomy had replaced the scholastic view, and the words began to enter the language of probability.  Daston (1994) has shown that around 1840 at least six probability theorists, apparently independently, began emphasizing the dual nature of probability, although they did not all use the objective-subjective terminology.  Thus Poisson, writing in 1837, used the French words chance and probabilité to describe the duality, but it was Cournot (1843, v) who first introduced the familiar terms, when he wrote that it was necessary for him to use “les deux épithètes d’objective et de subjective” in order to discuss the meaning of probability​[3]​ (emphasis in original).  Cournot’s work led to the development of the frequentist theory, although Daston (1994, 336) writes that neither he nor the other probabilists “went so far as to identify probabilities baldly with frequencies.”  Hacking (1990, 97) has pointed out that this frequentist emphasis coincided with the increasing availability of statistical data, that “the world teemed with frequencies, and the ‘objective’ notion would come to seem more important than the ‘subjective’ one for the rest of the century—simply because there were so many more frequencies to be known.”
The logician John Venn certainly described probability in terms of a frequency in his influential The Logic of Chance, first published in 1866.  A probability was obtained in principle from an infinitely long series:  “As we keep on taking more terms of the series … the proportion, in fact, will gradually approach towards some fixed numerical value” ([1866] 1888, 164).  It is interesting to note, however, that Venn opposed the use of the term “objective” to describe this probability.  He writes that Jacob Bernoulli’s famous limit theorem (Bernoulli [1713] 2006, 328 – 335) was “generally expressed somewhat as follows: in the long run all events will tend to occur with a relative frequency proportional to their objective probabilities” (91).  But Venn adds that there is “really nothing which we can with propriety call an objective probability,” to do so is “one of the last remaining relics of Realism,” an example of our “tendency to objectify our conceptions” (91 – 92).
 Frequentists in the early 20th century, on the other hand, were not opposed to regarding probability as being “objective.”  One finds, for example, Richard von Mises ([1928] 1981, 14) claiming that “the probability of a 6 is a physical property of a given die and is a property analogous to its mass, specific heat, or electrical resistance.”   R. A. Fisher was the pre-eminent frequentist of this era, and he believed that “a probability can have an objective value, independent of the state of our information, in the sense that the weight of an object, and the resistance of a conductor have objective values” (1934, 4). 
The opposing (metaphysically) subjective view that was developed at this time branched in two directions.  These are associated mainly with John Maynard Keynes and Harold Jeffreys on the one hand, and with Frank Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti and Leonard J. Savage on the other.  They are often referred to as logical (or objective) and personalist (or subjective) theories respectively.  Note that “objective” and “subjective” are used here in the epistemological sense described in Section 1; this is discussed further in Section 3. 
The logical view was described by Keynes in A Treatise on Probability, published in 1921 but written before World War I.  He regarded probability as a degree of belief, but stressed the need to avoid personal bias.  For him, probability was “concerned with the degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given conditions, and not merely with the actual beliefs of particular individuals, which may or may not be rational” (4, emphasis in original).  Furthermore, probability was interpreted as a logical relation between propositions, written (in current notation) as a conditional probability P(A|E), which is the extent to which proposition A is logically implied by the evidence E.  Keynes stressed that “when once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, what is probable or improbable in these circumstances has been fixed objectively, and is independent of our opinion” (4).  So for Keynes “objectivity” meant that, given prior information E, the probability of A would be the same for everyone.
Harold Jeffreys’s book Theory of Probability, first published in 1939, was a defense of Bayesian methods in probability, and his views were similar to those of Keynes.  Thus he regarded probability as a reasonable degree of belief, which should always be considered as conditional on some prior information.  He also claimed that, for a proposition p and data q, “two people both following the rules would arrive at the same value of P(p|q)” ([1939] 1961, 406).  Jeffreys avoided referring to probabilities as being “objective” or “subjective,” and he wrote that the terms “have been used in so many senses that they have become a source of confusion,” and “the less the words are used the better” ([1931] 1973, 210).
E. T. Jaynes was a strong supporter of the Jeffreys approach, but he regarded objectivity as a goal to be reached:  “Our goal is that inferences are to be completely ‘objective’ in the sense that two persons with the same prior information must assign the same prior probabilities” (2003, 373).  But Jaynes understood the difficulty involved, and also wrote: “There is no single universal rule for assigning priors—the conversion of verbal prior information into numerical prior probabilities is an open-ended problem of logical analysis” (88).  As a result, his goal of achieving objectivity is surely unlikely to be realized.  This, however, is an incorrect view of what objectivity means, as discussed in Section 3.   
An alternative to the logical theory is the personalist approach, where probability is also regarded as a degree of belief, but a purely personal one.  It is a measure of “the confidence that a particular individual has in the truth of a particular proposition” (Savage [1954] 1972, 3).  On this view, two people “faced with the same evidence may have different degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition” (3), since a person determines a probability “by interrogating himself, not by reference to the external world” (51).  This is in direct contrast to the logical view.  
In recent years there have been several uses of the term “objective” to describe a form of Bayesian analysis.  For example, the nature of the prior probability one should use has been emphasized by Berger (2006, 387), who writes that “the most familiar element of the objective Bayesian school is the use of objective prior distributions, designed to be minimally informative in some sense.”   On the other hand, Williamson (2010, 1) gives a number of criteria that qualify his approach as a “version of objective Bayesianism,” namely “the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should be probabilities, should respect constraints imposed by empirical evidence, but should otherwise equivocate between basic propositions.”  But without a definition of the word “objective” being given, it is not clear why the approaches of these authors deserve that description. 
 For further discussion of the dichotomy and probability, see Zabell (2011) and Baise (2013).

3. Definition of Objectivity

The survey given above shows there is some confusion in the way the objective and subjective terms have been used.  For example, both the frequentist approach and the logical view of writers such as Keynes and Jeffreys have been described as being “objective.”  Zabell (2011, 1164 – 68) has given further examples of conflicting interpretations of objective and subjective probabilities.
In discussing theories of probability, Gillies (2000, 20) has commented as follows: “The analysis of the notion of objectivity is a difficult matter.  Indeed, one could say that it is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy.”  In order to address this issue, an attempt is made here to define objectivity and subjectivity, and to distinguish their metaphysical and epistemological meanings.     
In the metaphysical dichotomy used in Section 2 to characterize the dual nature of probability, “subjective” refers to a state of knowledge, and the question then arises as to how one acquires this knowledge.  This gives rise to another (epistemological) dichotomy: one acquires knowledge either objectively or subjectively.  Knowledge that is subjective (i.e.,  acquired subjectively) is generally described as being prejudiced or biased, or based on arbitrary assumptions or personal feelings; objective knowledge is then inferred by contrast, as not prejudiced, not biased, and so on.  Textbooks on logic advise that, whenever possible, one should define a concept by what it is rather than by what it is not, but one will be hard-pressed to find such a definition of objectivity.  One writer on objectivity (Gaukroger 2012, 3) declines to define it, since “many difficulties are generated in the search for a definition, because ‘objectivity’ can be understood in different ways.”   
For a positive analysis of objectivity, consider the work of novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, whose philosophy relies strongly on this concept (1990, 18): 

Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept.  It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence.  Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver’s consciousness.  Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver’s (man’s) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic).

In addition, she defined “reason” as “the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses” (Peikoff 1991, 152), and stressed that the exercise of reason is volitional and not automatic.  So one can rephrase her description of epistemological objectivity as a formal definition: objectivity is a method of thought by means of which one acquires knowledge of reality by the volitional use of reason in accordance with the rules of logic.  The point here is that both reason and logic are involved, since it is possible to be rational when identifying true premises but be illogical when making deductions from them, and one can be perfectly logical in deducing a valid conclusion when starting with false premises.  Having defined objectivity in this way, it is not unreasonable to violate the rule given above by defining “subjective” as “not objective,” that is, by what it is not, since objectivity involves a specific way of thinking, whereas it is subjectivity that “can be understood in different ways.”  In short, if one’s method of thought is not objective then it is subjective; the two methods are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  
One can see now the problem with the interpretation of objectivity in the logical approach, in which a unique probability is supposedly obtainable from given prior information.  Objectivity, however, is properly understood as a method of thought, in which reason and logic are used to reach a conclusion.  So two individuals, given the same information, can both be objective yet assign different prior probabilities for an event or an hypothesis by making perfectly reasonable different assumptions.  Thus, for example, Jaynes’s use of maximum entropy methods to determine prior probabilities is an objective approach, but as he himself indicates (2003, 88), other methods, such as group invariance, can often also be of value.
4. Conclusion
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^1	  The word “fictum” was not translated by Spade.  Words added in brackets are suggested replacements taken from alternative translations, see Ockham (1990, 41) and Karskens (1992, 214).
^2	  Adolph Friedrich Hoffmann (1707-1741) taught at the University of Leipzig and was a follower of the influential German philosopher Christian Thomasius (1655-1728).  Their ideas are regarded as anticipating in some ways the philosophy of Kant.  See The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers. 2010. Edited by H. F. Klemme and M. Kuehn. London: Continuum Publishing.
^3	  For details of Cournot’s analysis of probability, see Zabell (2011, 1154 – 1157).
